estimates the effect of a medieval trading legacy on indices of income and religious demography. Note that medieval ports tend to have greater proportions of Muslims and lower municipal income per capita, both relative to otherwise similar non-medieval port towns (Panel A) and to towns that would have been medieval ports had they been at natural harbours (Panel B).However, despite being poorer and more ethnically mixed, medieval ports exhibit lower violence. Once again, as the placebo checks reveal, these effects are specific to medieval, not colonial, ports (Panel C). Despite the endogeneity of ethnic demography and population, assessing the residual effect of historical robust complementarity controlling for these factors may be of interest. Appendix Table 2 adds controls for population in 1901, polynomials in the percentage Muslim in 1901 and their interaction with medieval port. The table reveals that more larger, ethnically mixed medieval ports actually are less prone to religious violence. These results are consistent with the persistence of inter-ethnic complementarity in medieval ports: when a minority population specialises in a complementary service, increases in its population tend to increase intra-minority competition and improve the terms of trade for the members of the majority, reducing incentives for expropriative violence. The size interaction also reassures that our results are not driven by possible under-reporting in small medieval port towns. Appendix Table 3 provides Cox proportional hazards regressions of the survival of Hindu-Muslim tolerance (defined as time until the first outbreak of rioting) between 1850 and 1950, providing multivariate validation of the bivariate Kaplan-Meier comparison in the paper. Notice times ethnic tolerance in medieval ports have enjoyed a better survival probability than non-ports, with a medieval trade legacy reducing the hazard of religious rioting by between 6 times (Col 1) and more than 10 times (Cols 3-5) prior to 1950 when controlling for geographical and historical characteristics. Appendix Table 4 breaks down the riot effect over 1950-1995 into those that occurred before and after 1980. While this reduces the variation in the data-there are naturally fewer riots-the point estimates are fairly consistent before and after 1980: medieval ports continue to be half as riot-prone as other towns after 1980, and experience around 1.44 fewer riots, particularly when comparing towns within the same state and with the same levels of Partition flows (Col 7-9). This is the coastline just south of Bombay. Notice that medieval ports emerged on small indentations and water features near the coastline. In this example, a mountain range, the Western Ghats, both blocks such water features from penetrating while also causing major silting at the mouths of these rivers during the monsoon. This has resulted in some medieval ports being quite far inland and no longer enjoying a navigable outlet to the sea. Local polynomial smooths based upon the World Bank Agricultural and Climate Data Set which covers 271 districts within India's major agricultural states (The Northeast, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, West Godavari and Kerala are not in the data). The Harvest Price Premium is calculated as the harvest price difference each year for each major crop between the district and the yearly minimum for the country, weighted by the quantities produced in that district. The agricultural wage premium is simply the average rural agricultural wage in the district net of the yearly national minimum. Notice the general decline in harvest price differences for crops in different districts, consistent with increasing market integration for crops. In contrast, wage differences spiked in 1980 and continued to be larger thereafter, consistent with lower labour mobility between districts, and the persistence of differential local agricultural labour demand and supply conditions. 
